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Abstract: In the past years, Dutch citizens have experimented with various kinds of innovations to
organize the collective production of renewable energy, including shared wind power and solar PV
installations. Most of these attempts failed mainly due to legal issues and tax rules. Yet, one model
for solar PV on collective roofs was implemented more widely, namely the postcode rose (PCR,
postcoderoos): a form of cooperative solar PV production within a set of adjacent postcode areas.
Set within a broader transition perspective, this article studies the emergence and evolution of the
PCR as an example of a successful social innovation in the energy transition, through an innovation
biography and mapping of the evolution of the social and institutional network around the innovation.
The various attempts for collective solar PV, with different degrees of success and uptake into the
regime, present a key aspect of niche development, namely associational work (circulation and
mobilization) focused on regime change. In conclusion, the innovation path of the PCR emphasizes
the importance of the political and associational in the energy transition and in transition thinking.
Keywords: renewable energy; innovation biography; multi-level perspective; actor network theory
(ANT); grassroots innovation
1. Introduction
To contribute towards the implementation of new Renewable Energy (RE) technologies, scholars have
introduced the multi-level perspective (MLP) to understand the birth of new technologies and their
struggle for competitiveness within established systems [1]. Within MLP, the locus of innovations is
primarily situated in niches, sheltered spaces that are free of strict regulations and market forces and have
room for experimentation. Niches are nurtured and expanded through interaction with the wider regime
of prevalent rules, resource allocations, and practices. This paper contributes to the debate on the political
nature of sustainable transitions and the possibilities for niches to increase their impact within existing
regimes, to ‘roll out’ and ‘scale up’. The aim of this paper is to gain further insight into niche–regime
interactions with particular attention towards the process of capacity building of niches enabling such
rolling out. It does so through an analysis of 20 years of attempts by Dutch niches to make collective RE
production possible. This longitudinal focus enables to draw conclusions beyond single case studies,
and to see niche–regime interactions in a political rather than technological-managerial perspective [2].
Furthermore, it enables to go beyond caricatures of challenger-incumbent distinctions [3]. To do so,
this paper introduces a novel understanding of sustainability innovations from relational geography
and adopts the methodology of the innovation biography [4]: a mapping of the evolution of the (social)
network around the innovation in its time-space dimension.
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Other European countries, such as Germany, Italy [5], and Denmark [6], used a long-term
Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) to promote innovative renewable technologies such as wind energy or solar
PV. Despite lobbying for a FIT [7], The Netherlands used a net-metering scheme to promote small-scale
RE-installations [8,9], resulting in considerable less small RE installations than the above mentioned
countries [10]. Therefore, this paper zooms in onto trajectories of innovations in The Netherlands
aiming for collective RE production. There have been multiple attempts by Dutch citizens to organize
renewable energy production in a collective way in The Netherlands, e.g., through wind power
cooperatives and solar PV on collective roofs. Most of these innovations did not materialize or
grow beyond the phase of pilot projects, apart from a handful of wind cooperatives. The projects
faced challenges such as financial, organizational, and [7] legal restrictions and unfavorable tax
rules. From these multiple attempts, one model provided a viable option for the production of solar
PV on collective roofs, namely the ‘postcode rose’ (PCR, postcoderoos) [8]. This form of collective
RE production provides an example of an evolution from a niche to struggles with the regime,
and ultimately to further developments, negotiations, and alignment that led to the adoption of an
innovative model for solar PV on collective roofs into the regime. The structure of the paper is as
follows. First, we elaborate our conceptual approach, based on transition theory and actor-network
thinking, and our methodological approach, based on the ‘innovation biography’. Then follows an
in-depth discussion of the emergence and evolution of collective solar projects, culminating in the
PCR. Theoretically and practically, the conclusion responds to the question of how regime change was
provoked by niche developments.
2. Theory
Our theoretical approach is built around a four-step argument regarding niche–regime interaction.
First, although it also embraces more technical and organizational aspects, the niche–regime interaction
is inherently political. Second, niche work should be seen as primarily associational, that is, as forging
relations determining positions, roles, and capacities of relevant actors. Third, this results in the ability
of niche innovations to learn and travel and, forth, to create political mobilization. Through these
steps, discussed consecutively below, we move our theoretical focus from transition theory to
actor-network thinking.
2.1. Transformation beyond the Niche
The transformation from a fossil-fuel based energy system towards a low-carbon RE system
requires a transition of technical, social, and economic systems [11]. These transitions imply a move
away from incumbent energy systems towards new technologies and actors in a transformed energy
system. However, new energy technologies and actors face established energy systems, which are
highly efficient in economic terms, and have a high density of regulation and strong presence of vested
interests, which hinder straightforward implementation of new RE technologies.
Overcoming such barriers presents a key theme in strategic niche management literature
(SNM) [12]. In strategic niches, sustainability innovations are protected from regime and market
forces in order to freely experiment and develop into robust and replicable models that, on rolling out,
can withstand market forces. This approach rests on (1) the identification of necessary technological
and institutional changes for the new technology, (2) learning about the technical, economic, and social
desirability of options, (3) encouraging the further development of the new technology enabling
diffusion and (4) actively building a support network. Besides their technological roles, niches should
play a role in institutional adaptation [13]. Smith and Raven (2012) identify two types of niche
empowerment: fit and conform, and stretch and conform. The first refers to the situation in which
niches are empowered to engage with institutional adaptation without changing the basic regime
structure, whereas the latter refers to empowerment also targeting regime changes. An important role
is played by intermediaries in connecting to regime actors and in upscaling and diffusion of the more
mature models, aimed by success factors and step-by-step plans [14,15].
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Despite their institutional sensitivity, SNM has been criticized for its ‘unworldly’ perspective due
to lack of political and power-laden awareness [16–18]. Behind the scholarly insights from SNM and
the MLP on how niches ought to be managed and empowered, lies the mundane reality in which niche
actors struggle to survive in difficult social and political environments cf. [19]. Therefore, attention
has recently shifted to the political nature of transitions and the power relations involved with niche
empowerment and institutional embedding cf. [17,19–23]: “The politics of grassroots innovation
manifest itself through practical experimentation, learning, organizing, and mobilization that enables
communities to position themselves in opposition to the unsustainable and unjust systems that to a
significant extent characterize our world, and to build up their power to develop alternatives” [24].
Two political perspectives on sustainability niches stand out. The first perspective, ‘niche policy
advocacy’, addresses the criticism on SNM and pays explicit attention to the political network building
around niches [19]. This perspective dedicates a critical role to niche advocacy actors, who try to
raise political support through forging alliances with (regime) actors. These advocacy actors are of
a more intermediary nature, who try to connect niches to resources and political supporters. Yet,
this poses a risk. The alignment of resources and politics may turn niche innovations more ‘mainstream’.
Niche policy advocacy, accordingly, is susceptible to co-optation. Since it provides the incumbents
with the full contours of change and innovation, it gives them the opportunity to attune and tame,
and to make the transition as harmless for the regime as possible. ‘Niche policy advocacy’ therefore
requires a certain level of shared commitment and vision at the regime level.
The second perspective pays attention to ‘critical niches’ as radical voices that challenge traditional
discourses on fundamental issues of sustainability. Where SNM and advocacy perspectives ultimately
deal with niches that sprout from or connect to existing knowledge and worldviews, critical niches
act on a different level, speaking from a different knowledge base and worldview [25]. Their aim is
not so much to ‘mainstream’ radical innovations, but to challenge dominant discourses and act as
ultimate antagonists cf. [26]. Although alternative worldviews offer an endless creative and productive
potential, critical niches are hardly recognized as ‘niches’ in MLP-terms. Here, the main risk is that of
isolation and confinement. Ultimately, without reaching out, the transformative potential of critical
niches remains unheard and untapped.
The challenge is to provide a perspective able to accommodate critical niches with advocacy
capacity, avoiding the co-optation of advocacy niches and isolation of critical niche. So what should
such a perspective entail? In our view, such niches can emerge through associational work along two
lines. First, network building leading to effective exchange of knowledge and practices, fuelling niches
with the capacity to trial, demonstrate, and roll-out change. Second, forging of relations through which,
in a more ‘affective’ way, changes mind-sets and perspectives at the wider (regime) level. We consider
such associational work, in a fundamental way, as constitutive of the niches, the networks it which
they operate and the wider regime. Accordingly, the perspective elaborated here departs from the
singular focus on empowering niches. Instead, it assumes that innovations are invented, developed,
and implemented in networks of actors, conceptualized as network-based grassroots innovations (GIs)
with niches as evolving sites of operation.
2.2. An Associational Approach to Transition
Conceptually, our approach builds upon insights from Actor-Network Theory (ANT) [27,28],
which offers a rich vocabulary helps to observe and analyze associations and associational work.
In brief, ‘associations’ emerge in three steps, namely through ‘interessment’ (creating mutual
affect), ‘enrolment’ (relation building), and ‘mobilization’ (aligning of elements to make an effective
network) [27,29,30]. Each successful act of association, e.g., when something new is being related to a
grassroots site, alters both the site and the network. Moreover, in ANT-terms, when a network emerges,
it forges new agency and establishes a single identity or ‘spokesperson’ for its network. In doing so,
the network itself gets backgrounded in favor of the spokesperson representing the network. To give
an example, from the moment local activities are being recognized as innovative and as a distinctive set
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of practices, this translates into a representation or ‘model’. This ‘model’, in turn, attracts the attention,
pushing the network of activities from which it was created to the background.
Recent thinking along these lines has identified two basic of associational processes, one based
on circulation and one based on making presences and absences [31,32]. ANT’s emphasis on
circulation [33,34] highlights the ways in which, through associations, innovations, ideas, and practices
travel from place to place, inspiring and affecting local processes of GI development along the
way. In order to travel, entities need to be scripted, that is, turned into concrete protocols, tools,
and devices for action, upon which GIs draw. Scripting takes material, semantic, and semiotic
forms (spec-lists, blue-prints of technological protocols, organizational models, policy documents,
etc.). This presents a rich repertoire on which sites of innovation can draw, through cycles of
adoption (with standard enrolment and translation), and adaptation (through negotiation and creative
translation) [35]. Circulation, in this way, presents the engine of capacity building and knowledge
proliferation driving transition.
Where circulation yields capacities, in an ‘effective’ sense, presences and absences refer more to
inspiration and motivation, in an ‘affective’ sense [36]. Presences serve to underpin certain associational
practices and strategies, while discouraging others. For GIs, on the one hand, this entails the logics and
stories that frame innovations in the light of a more sustainable, well-shared and comfortable world.
Regimes, on the other, manifest established patterns of presences and absences underpinning their core
characteristics. There are, moreover, two kinds of absences: first, those logics and stories which are
recognized, but pushed to the background and ignored, because they are not considered of significance
or relevance anymore; second, logics and stories which are neglected and denied, because if they were
recognized, they could not be ignored. In associational work, such ‘othering’ is important to keep
processes manageable and practical, as well as emotional. It also, clearly, poses a major dilemma,
since it makes a site blind to threats and opportunities. How to deal with presences and absences,
accordingly, is key aspect of the politics of transition. In the context of associational work, such politics
entails the work of ‘framing’, that is, in the words of Callon: “to select, to sever links and finally to
make trajectories (at least temporarily) irreversible” [37].
2.3. Learning: Capacity Building in Topological Settings
In an effective sense, associational work results in a connective tissue through which knowledge,
tools, and resources can be exchanged and evolve. Accordingly, learning takes place alternatingly
or simultaneously in different spaces, constituting a ‘learning network’. Circulation of innovative
practices across sites in learning networks leads to mutations, intensification and hence proliferation of
niche practices. Whether or not innovative practices circulate and connect somewhere else depends
on wider environmental factors. Connections can only be made selectively, towards other parts
of the learning network that are accessible and open to the practice. Factors such as regulation,
resource allocation, communication infrastructure, education, and innovation policy, attitudes towards
collaboration, risk-taking, and innovativeness all bear upon which forms of association and circulation
can and do arise. This is where the regime comes in.
The circulation within learning networks, in turn, creates path dependencies, in which certain
capacities stemming from innovative practice are built, nurtured and embedded, including organizational,
commercial, and technological competencies. This leads to association and circulation as an evolutionary
trajectory during which niche practices develop within a learning network. The result is further
specialization of both practice and network, which may make it actually harder for the practice
to connect with other networks. Consequently, despite the existence of many global platforms of
exchange, deep learning networks often manifest marked spatial patterns, due to the many constraints
faced in associational processes and capacity building to cross institutional-administrative and cultural
boundaries [38]. Within these limits, what is important to recognize is how incremental learning,
supported by some form of oversight, agenda-setting, and dissemination, forms a key driver through
which grassroots innovations contribute to transition movements.
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2.4. Political Mobilization
To impact upon concrete policy-making and regulatory regimes, political mobilization primarily
plays the affective card. Following Meadowcroft’s ideas on ‘everyday politics’, transitions require
that “appeal must be made to broader coalitions for social change” [17] through associational
efforts. Benefiting from their autonomous and independent position, and their capacity to create
alternative learning networks and marshal public support, GIs can contribute to coalitions for,
and agendas of energy transitions, both in more incremental and more radical ways [39]. The key
of mobilization is thus to bring more and more agents under the spell of the transition ambitions
and agenda. Mobilization prompts GIs activities to convey transition ambitions by invoking images
of a better, greener, hopeful future, as ‘practical anticipations of more sustainable societies’ [24].
This requires, in other words, bringing certain images and stories to presence, through acts of
framing and story-telling. To gain further outreach, an important strategy of attracting public support
for transition is the framing and presenting of energy issues and (long-term) solutions in different
forms of media [40]. Today, the media (including social-media) feature as an important arena for
changing public opinion on issues like climate change and energy transition, that is, for creating
wider ‘interessement’. The tone exhibited toward specific initiatives and innovations in the media
has an important effect on how persuasive framing is [41], for example through positive or negative
tones, the representation of cause-effect relations, the perceived sense of urgency, and any possible
erroneous stories. An important affective means, as will discuss further below, it the capacity to
irritate established actors and powers. While persuasion paves the way for interessement, it is often
irritation, also called ‘perturbations’ [42,43], which triggers further action. True innovations provoke
reactions from regime actors and institutions: the incumbent energy system is irritated, and has to
deal with this innovation. Reactions may vary from ignoring the innovation to fighting innovation,
or co-opting and incorporating innovation by incumbents. In any case, there will always be a response,
targeting the innovation, accommodating, or ignoring it, often prompted by the wish to protect and
even better markets position for instance through merger activity.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Methods: The Innovation Biography
The innovation biography is a biography of a clearly labeled innovation, whose history is
described on the basis of interviews with the actors involved and content analysis. According to
Butzin and Widmaier “the key methodological principle [of an innovation biography] is to follow
an innovation idea over time by analyzing the interactions of innovation actors and by applying an
open, inductive approach to data analysis” [4]. The biography is shaped with the help of a time-space
perspective and a mapping of the evolution of the (social) network around the innovation. This way,
the developments of an innovation, including details of associational work, can be traced over time.
For the selection criteria of cases of innovations this research firstly mapped the grassroots sites in
The Netherlands which resulted in a database of 360 initiatives for the results, see a previous work [8].
From this database, innovative initiatives were identified, which resulted in 32 initiatives. A further
selection criteria was the presence of ‘irritations’. One innovation with a visible history that caused
irritation to the regime was the PCR, which has been subject to negotiations between community
groups, the Dutch government, and the tax department during the past years. An initial trace of its
history revealed more conflict and multiple different attempts to realize collective solar PV, which is
why the case was adopted.
3.2. Data Collection and Analysis
The research used three strategies for data collection. Firstly, Parliamentary reports and
documents which represented the reactions from the regime were analyzed (see Appendix A).
Secondly, key grassroots representatives were interviewed to understand GI’s associational work
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(see Appendix B). Thirdly, we conducted participatory observations during events to understand
the broader societal discussions around the innovations (see Appendix C). On the basis of the
parliamentary reports and documents of grassroots, a reconstruction was made of the chains of
events, which were discussed and corrected during the interviews with the key actors. The content
analysis was based on the coding of key terms from our associational vocabulary (see Section 2).
4. Results
4.1. The Social Innovation Question: How to Create a Feasible Business Case for Collective RE Production?
Compared to ‘grey’ energy, ‘green’ energy is relatively expensive, as negative externalities such
as contributing to climate change or air pollution are not calculated in the price of energy based on
fossil fuel sources. As a consequence, RE faces difficulties in entering the energy market. Historically,
collective RE production in the form of wind power was first enabled through the 1989 Electricity
Act, which allowed for grid access and competitive rates [8]. Direct supply of collective RE to owners
was not technically feasible, therefore, members owned shares in collective production (primarily
wind turbines), and sold the electricity on the market. They had individual contracts with energy
companies for their consumption, including a ‘normal’ tax regime imposing energy tax and VAT.
When the price of (Chinese) PV roof panels dropped dramatically from the late 2000s onwards,
self-supply (nontaxed) PV energy became economically viable for individual households. However,
Dutch Citizen’s cooperatives were also seeking to consume ‘their own’ produced RE directly, without
interference of tax administration, as a means to make ‘green’ energy economically more competitive
to ‘grey’ energy and implement collectively what was already done at household level: a form of net
metering. Therefore, collective RE production can be seen as social innovation challenge pressing for
institutional change [44]. Tracing back the social innovation of collective RE production, we distinguish
three critical attempts to make collective RE production possible. Although other attempts exist [45,46],
we illustrate these three typical niche attempts to circulate grassroots innovations and create alliances,
namely on self-supply, collective supply, and virtual balancing.
4.2. Learning: Three Attempts of Capacity Building for Collective RE Production
De Windvogel: In 1998, Dick van Elk, founder and the then chairman of cooperative de Windvogel
started the organization SGEP (Samenwerkende Groene Energie Producenten) as a way to build
support to make consumption of self-supplied RE possible, but legal constraints blocked this first
initiative. Years later, in 2009, de Windvogel initiated a successful pilot project on self-supply with the
ENECO energy company, which ran until May 2010. This pilot project was continued in 2011 with
another energy company, called ANODE, which included the energy self-supply of 200 Windvogel
members. Essentially, the argument was that an owner should have the right to use electricity
self-produced elsewhere, without interference of the Tax administration. Since this was compared with
harvesting one’s own vegetables in a community garden, this was called the ‘lettuce model’ (‘kropje
sla’ model). Such framing served to inspire and motivate other actors to cooperate. Together with
ANODE, the cooperative provoked a test case to see whether this was legally sound. Yet, in 2012 the
Tax inspector ruled against self-supply thwarting further circulation of the innovation. De Windvogel
objected at the Tax judge in The Hague, and tried to work via Parliament. However, in July 2013 the
judge ruled once more in favor of the tax inspector, and the same happened when ANODE appealed.
These first attempts thus demonstrated that active experimentation and strong framing were unable to
counter core incumbent interests and positions.
De Ster, Nijmegen: In 2011 in Nijmegen, a local initiative started to build a collective PV installation
of 259 solar panels on a roof of school building, ‘De Ster’). To do so, local entrepreneur Felix Sommerdijk
initiated Zonnepark Nederland, composed of the municipality and inhabitants from Lent. Besides the
individual citizens from the neighborhood (Lent), the ‘Zonnepark’ collective was joined by the owner
of the school building and the municipality of Nijmegen; it was supported by Alliander and Liander
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(net operator). The project gained a lot of national attention, as it was presented as a radically new way
to enable communally produced renewable energy. Because of the newness of distant net metering, it
presented a pilot case to test the tax system. The risk that distant net metering would not be allowed
was mentioned to interested participants, but nobody assumed that the tax department would not grant
an exception. The project received broad political support, including from the Ministry of Economic
Affairs. On 23 August 2012 was the big launch of the solar park, together with national MP Jolande
Sap, and after production of PV had started, the tax department finally had to respond. To everyone’s
surprise, the tax department did not allow the virtual net metering by participants that would enable
them to deduct the electricity from their private consumption and make a profit on their investment.
This caused the initiative to fail. However, the individual members were saved from a financial loss by
the municipality of Nijmegen, which bought all the PV panels from the individual citizens and now
privately owns the installation. The case taught a costly lesson to Nijmegen municipality: even for
technically, economically, and socially desirable projects, one cannot count on actors or rules of the
regime to change in order to accommodate the innovation.
Net metering, Amsterdam: 2011 marked the next conscious attempt from a collective PV project
to provoke a regime reaction. Despite knowing the limitations for virtual metering in the Energy
Act, the municipality of Amsterdam announced to start with a program for Owners Associations to
collectively produce electricity. The municipality presented this initiative as a chance to produce PV
energy on the abundant flat rooftops of the city, as this was currently impossible due to metering
regulations. In the spring of 2012, three pilot projects (de Vrolijke Eik II, Nieuwe Kerkstraat, and
Renswouderstraat) started to test ‘virtual net metering’ (virtueel salderen) to make collective RE
production financially feasible. As energy tax benefits were possible for individual home owners
(‘behind’ the meter), but not for Owners Associations owning the rooftop (‘before’ the meter), a smart
combination of the individual meters and collective rooftop was constructed. The collectively produced
electricity was to be deducted from the energy bills of each participant, each receiving a virtual share
of the electricity that matched the size of their investment. As most roofs in Amsterdam are collectively
owned, the municipality viewed this construction as a means to reach their municipal PV production
targets. Capacity building was established through participation of energy company NUON and grid
operator Liander, and the solar panels were installed by Zonnestroom in September 2012. However,
like before, the initiators anticipated leniency from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the tax
department, but this did not come forward, and the pilot project was not continued after 2012 [45].
Now that provoking the system through presenting it with near-finished projects had not worked,
initiators resorted to lobbying for changes in regulation and taxation laws. They started seeking
support through further enrolling municipalities and network operators. Two of these attempts were
specifically set up to challenge the tax system. However, the Tax department of the central government
refused to engage in further debate, referring to the Electricity Act that prohibits any net metering
‘before the meter’. Further legal explorations and cases made clear that the current laws around tax
and duties proved hard to change.
4.3. Responses from the (Tax) Regime: Present Absences and Othering
Lobbying continued with mobilizing two Members of Parliament (MP), Diederik Samsom of the
social democrats (PVDA), and Paulus Jansen from the socialist party (SP) who made four attempts
for regime change. Firstly, in November 2008, MP Samsom requested an inquiry into the possibilities
of self-supply, presented and framed as the ‘Lettuce model’, which was endorsed by parliament [47].
The then Minister of Economic Affairs, Maria van der Hoeven, however, was reluctant to follow
up the ideas [48]. Presenting a good example of constructing ‘present absences’, she side-lined the
arguments and proposed other means to increase local support for wind energy projects. Secondly, in
June 2011 Samsom made another attempt by benefiting from the Emergency Investment Act (‘Crisis-en
Herstelwet’) which had been issued to abate the impact to the global economic crisis. He proposed a
legal solution enabling collective production of electricity for members of cooperatives. Once more,
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he failed to muster support from but the Minister and Parliament [49]. Thirdly, Jansen then tried the
same by requesting the Cabinet to change law and policy via a parliamentary resolution [50]. However,
this was not carried out by Cabinet. Finally, in December 2011, MPs Samsom and Jansen posed a
motion on self-sufficiency (zelflevering), but a small majority rejected the amendment [51]. It appeared
that despite large political support for visible pilot projects, the more abstract notion of virtual net
metering did not yield the political consensus to install more favorable tax rules.
In the end, the four attempts did not change the energy and tax regime. Yet, it made clear that
all the ‘irritation’ had produced political support for facilitation collective RE production, albeit not
via the Lettuce-model or self-sufficiency model. The Cabinet and their coalition parties feared that
such tax exemptions would be too costly for the treasury. Yet the idea of making serious changes
in energy supply and distribution remained; there was no ‘othering’. This became manifest when,
at the fall of the Cabinet on 23 April 2012, the Parliament agreed on the so-called Spring Agreement
(Lenteakkoord; 26 April 2012). This budget agreement introduced a subsidy on PV installations for
individual households and promised research to test the feasibility of collective net metering [52].
4.4. Capacity Building: The Introduction of the Postcode Rose as a Model for Collective RE Production
After the Parliamentary elections of 12 September 2012, in their coalition agreement, the new Cabinet
presented the idea of an Energy tax discount for cooperatives producing their own local energy [53].
MP Samsom, whose party PVDA moved from opposition to cabinet, and who coauthored the coalition
agreement, played a major role in this. According to the vision of the Cabinet, citizens appreciate
the possibility to produce their own RE [54]. Subsequently, the idea was copied literally into the
Energy Agreement of 2013 [55]. The Energy Agreement was signed by a broad coalition of societal
organizations, including business organizations and environmental organizations, and was supported
by government, and consequently created a larger network for the elaboration of the Energy tax
discount. Pushing for innovative institutional adaptation, the agreement introduced the Postcode Rose
(PCR), which demarcated the geographical range of citizens who could join a collective RE project.
It stipulated that citizens participating in energy cooperatives or Homeowner Associations could enjoy
an Energy tax discount of € 7.5 ct/kWh excl. VAT, provided that the collective production facility is
situated within their own or adjacent postal codes (hence the ‘rose’). This energy tax was originally
an environmental taxation scheme (Regulating Energy Tax; REB), installed in 1996, as a kind of CO2
taxation, but was never presented as such. In 2004 the REB was transformed into an the Energy Tax,
as part of the general environmental taxation scheme [56]. A large network of cooperatives and other
stakeholders was created through the Energy Agreement, which enabled the circulation of the new
ideas and measures.
From 2014 onwards, two energy umbrella organizations, ‘ODEdecentraal’ and ‘HIER opgewekt’
started to systematically collect knowledge on the PCR, what it entailed, how it could work and how
to implement it. This led to a codified model, which had some general characteristics, but also allowed
for major variations to accommodate different local settings and conditions (e.g., support from local
and regional government, businesses, etc.). These lessons and further discussions resulted in two
major calls. First, the need arose for a long period (ten years) of tax certainty, to secure the investments
made by the energy cooperatives [57]. Second, it was recognized that local energy had the potential
to contribute to the goals of the national energy policy, and could be a source of innovation and
‘energy-consciousness’. Consequently, citizens participating in collective production of RE would be
rewarded with net metering and PCR tax discount [54]. With the inclusion of these two amendments,
the PCR was adopted and formalized in the national Tax Plan of 2014.
For energy cooperatives, however, the amendments turned out to be insufficient in practice
to enable sustainable business models, for several reasons. They started to express their concerns
about feasibility almost immediately after the approval of the Tax plan [58]: the local business case
for a PCR was too thin due to continuing high levels of VAT, the window for tax certainty (calling
for 15 years), the narrow spatial demarcation (calling for municipal borders instead of postcode
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zones). Additional issues were that the technical requirement for suppliers to build a second grid
connection proved rather costly, and that only private households could participate, excluding
entrepreneurs and self-employed businesses. The concerns were confirmed through the research
of a consultancy firm Atrivé [59]. The initial response from the Cabinet was to moot these concerns.
In effect, rather than prioritizing small, local projects the Cabinet continued to express a preference
for large scale, centralized, and commercially oriented approaches to meeting national RE targets.
However, due to mounting ‘irritation’, this position could not be held for long.
4.5. Mobilization through Associations and Framing of the PCR
In 2014, the chairmen of the cooperative ‘Morgen Groene Energie’ (MGE) and the umbrella
organization ODEdecentraal entered into negotiations with the Ministries of Economic Affairs and
Finance (including the Tax Administration) to improve PCR’s feasibility. The negotiations centered
on PCR’s feasibility as initially calculated for the Energy Agreement, questioning the assumptions
underpinning the costs of a PCR business used by the government. The employees of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs were very cooperative, as it was their Minister who signed the Energy Agreement.
The Minister himself also repeatedly stressed that this regulation had to become a success and that he
was dedicated to make this happen in practice [60]. Therefore, the negotiations focused on the exact
PCR rules, regulations, and ways of implementing, in a coordinated manner that was workable for
the Tax Administration. In the end, the Cabinet largely acknowledged the grassroots’ implementation
model and business calculations of the PCR, but refused to act on it, to the great frustration of the
representatives of the community energy movement.
Alongside the negotiations, the energy cooperatives informed MPs about their concerns [61]
resulting in various solutions. The costs for the second grid connection were resolved. Entrepreneurs
were allowed to join and the tax certainty period was raised to 15 years [60,62]. The biggest issue
remained the VAT, the sole responsibility of the Tax administration, which put grassroots initiatives at
a competitive disadvantage. To improve the business case of the PCR, the network of the grassroots
needed to be enlarged. Both chairmen of MGE and ODEdecentraal were well connected with several
parties within Parliament, and consequently, they knew that there was a majority in Parliament in
favor of further improvements to the PCR. However, the Departments of Economic Affairs and Finance
had already taken action to improve the regulations of the PCR, so MPs saw no political need for
further action.
To push the MPs and ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance to improve the feasibility of the
PCR, MGE and ODEdecentraal further broadcasted their version and calculations of the PCR. To this
end, they used the media attention given by the TV show ‘EenVandaag’ (25 October 2014). They also
mobilized their contacts at the standing committee of the national Socio-Economic Council (SER).
The committee is charged with safeguarding the Energy Agreement of 2013, and has a directly influence
on the Minister of Economic Affairs. The two chairmen also continued negotiating with employees
of the Departments of Economics and Finance/Tax Administration [63], through the exchange and
discussions of spreadsheets detailing the business case of the PCR. The calculations were put online
and debated with the wider community of energy cooperatives, also via blogs [64] and the website of
umbrella organization HIER Opgewekt.
Bringing the business case to presence this way finally proved successful. In September 2015,
Ed. Nijpels, director of the SER standing committee negotiated with the Cabinet for a tax benefit of
9 ct/kwh, which consequently became effective in 2016. Subsequently, an amendment on the 2016 Tax
plan by Schouten, Grashoff, and Van Weyenberg (17 November 2015) proposed to exempt PCR projects
from tax, which was adopted by parliament. This was done in tandem with raising the energy tax
on gas, in order to compensate the Treasury for the loss in tax. In addition, this amendment adopted
the possibility of locating the production installation not only in the center of the PCR, but also in
one of the ‘leafs’ of the PCR [65]. This extension (also characterized as the ‘postal code caterpillar’,
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postcoderups), meant that although the local focus is maintained, projects got more freedom to expand
the area in which the project is offered to participants.
While conditions have substantially improved, PCR’s time frame is still limited. So far, the PCR
model has gained in popularity, with 63 new PCR projects in 2017. However, the subsequent rise in
the costs of the model have been cause for concern of the Department of Economic Affairs. The 2018
Climate Agreement foresees the termination of the PCR by 2020, after which cooperatives have to
resort to the basic RE subsidy (SDE+) for large solar projects, which has a capped annual budget and
thus a limited number of approved applications per year. What scope there will be for grassroots
innovations either private households or local collectives remains to be seen.
5. Conclusions and Discussion
Who was able to beat the Dutch Tax Department? Our initial question receives a clear answer
from our case: nobody did! Not even the Department of Economic Affairs could resolve the VAT
issue to create a feasible business case or grant exceptions for the early pilot projects whose ideas they
supported. Although both Ministries partook in the PCR negotiations, neither of the two Ministries
wanted to bear the financial brunt. The Schouten tax reduction amendment only worked out because
it was compensated by increasing the energy tax.
This case illustrates the political and power-laden nature of sustainability transitions,
going beyond the focus on organizational and technological challenges for niche growth and upscaling.
Following an associational approach, examining processes of learning, framing, and mobilization,
we have traced the way PCR, as an alternative model, has made its way through political circuits.
During almost twenty years, various innovations were launched that would make it feasible to
collectively produce RE, from self-supply to virtual balancing, but they were all blocked by the
regime. Regime rules were clear: self-supply and the lettuce-model were not legal. They were
side-lined, and even ‘othered’. In response, grassroots networks caused ‘irritation’, through provoking
reactions from the Tax Department, tax judges, and other regime actors. The result was that, in 2012,
the policy statement of the incoming government provided scope within the energy regime for
grassroots actors [53]. In a path dependent way, the PCR model was developed during further
negotiations leading up to signing the Energy Agreement [55]. Yet this path also produced rigidity.
The Cabinet feared that changing parts of the Energy Agreement would open the door for other
actors demanding similar changes, and eventually the breakdown of the complete agreement or
overburdening government budget. They thus blocked further change and limited the time frame in
which grassroots innovations can foster in order to keep the RE budget manageable.
This development demonstrates the two sides of associational work. On the one hand, there is
the effective grasping and circulation of technical knowledge (including business models), resulting in
capacity building and the mobilization of stakeholders to induce change. On the other, our case
demonstrates the significance of acts of framing, through which issues and concerns are selectively
brought to presence, and through which support and clout emerged by forging alliances with natural
allies. In addition, by constantly reframing the issue, also through extending the network with
media partners, MPs and the SER standing committee, cabinet needed to take a stance as well.
Continual irritation played a vital role.
Concerning the concept of regime, our emphasis on associational work calls for a more nuanced
view towards the niche–regime distinction. Within the regime, we have witnessed clear differences
in way actors cooperate with grassroots innovations. Because the minister of Economic Affairs
committed himself to the PCR by signing the Energy Agreement, his ministry was dedicated towards
accommodating the PCR, while the Ministry of Finance only feared negative financial impact and
resisted. We also noted how MPs and other regime actors actively engage with niches. Our case show
that these positions are not straightforward and should not be treated too simplistically [23].
In addition, our associational approach enables a perspective upon social innovation as evolution
of models with alternating ‘parents’. Although the forms, labels and actors were different during
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the two decades of evolution, an innovative model developed, which was in alignment with several
actor-networks. This was enabled by a process of learning, through mobilizing other actors for support
and framing the model in the media or via MPs. In this context, the chairs of MGE and ODEdecentraal
can be seen as ‘pragmatic system builders’ [23], connecting with MPs and engaging with the ‘everyday
politics’ of sustainability transitions cf. [17]. Consequently, in terms of transition thinking, no hard
distinctions between fit and conform or stretch and conform could be drawn cf. [19].
Although these pragmatic system builders engage with regime actors to improve the rules of
the game, the energy game is still tailored to a centralized energy system [6], which is reflected in the
way the Energy Tax is shaped. If the system is to be changed towards a decentralized energy system,
connections with critical niches are necessary. The question is how to connect to critical niches without
having them losing their critical edge [3]. We think that our associational approach could contribute in
connecting radical niches to intermediaries.
On a more applied level, the use of innovation biography raises questions about the room
for innovation and learning in the RE sector. Decentral renewable energy production is a topic
that becomes increasingly urgent and politically recognized, but the balance between openness to
innovation and budget keeping has consistently favored larger scale RE production and capped
budgets. The reluctance to really transform energy tax and financing thwarts organizational and
financial innovations such as the PCR, leaving a lot of potential RE production and local involvement
and support for the energy transition untapped. In attempting to change the status quo, bringing
successful pilot projects to presence does not seem to yield much result. Yet, the visibility of upscaling
failures helped to strengthen the ongoing lobby that initiators maintained for years. For the moment,
incremental changes such as the adaptations to the original PCR model appear more feasible but do
not guarantee the embedment of the innovation into the regime. Hopefully, if the PCR is abandoned
shortly, this lobby will provoke change going beyond the current traditional subsidy system.
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• E-Decentraal, Duurzame Energie Koepel. (2014). Notitie decentrale duurzame energie–Verbeterpunten
bij uitvoering Energieakkoord. Utrecht: ODE decentraal.
• HIER opgewekt (2012). Braaf of stout salderen. Pleidooi voor virtueel salderen.
• Jansen P, Van Tongeren L, Samsom D. (2011). Voorzienings- en leveringszekerheid energie;
Motie Paulus Jansen c.s. over het salderen van zelfopgewekte elektriciteit. Den Haag: Tweede
Kamer der Staten-Generaal.
• Minister van Economische Zaken (2009). Zelflevering voor stimulering duurzame energie.
Den Haag: Ministerie van Economische Zaken.
• Minister van Economische Zaken. (2013). Visie lokale energie. Den Haag: Tweede Kamer
Der Staten-Generaal.
• Morgen Groene Energie (2016). Blog Zonneparken In Oprichting.
• Rutte M, Samsom D. Bruggen slaan (2012). Regeerakkoord VVD-PVDA. Den Haag: VVD & PvdA.
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• Samsom D, Jansen P. (2011). MOTIE VAN DE LEDEN SAMSOM EN PAULUS JANSEN.
Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaten van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw
en Innovatie (XII) voor het jaar 2013. Memorie van toelichting. Den Haag: Tweede Kamer der
Staten-Generaal; 2011.
• Samsom D, Spies L, Wiegman-van Meppelen Scheppink E. (2008) GEWIJZIGDE MOTIE VAN
HET LID SAMSOM C.S. TER VERVANGING VAN DIE GEDRUKT ONDER NR. 50. Den Haag:
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal.
• Samsom D. (2011) AMENDEMENT VAN HET LID SAMSOM. Wijziging van de Crisis- en
herstelwet en enkele andere wetten (verbeteringen en aanvullingen). Den Haag: Tweede Kamer
der Staten-Generaal.
• Schouten C, Grashoff R, van Weyenberg S. (2015). Wijziging van enkele belastingwetten en enige
andere wetten (Belastingplan 2016) GEWIJZIGD AMENDEMENT VAN HET LID SCHOUTEN
C.S. TER VERVANGING VAN DAT GEDRUKT ONDER NR. 37. Den Haag: Tweede Kamer
der Staten-Generaal.
• SER (2013). Energieakkoord voor duurzame groei. Den Haag: Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER).
• Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2014). Verslag van een algemeen overleg gehouden op
2 juli 2014 over decentrale energie. Den Haag.
• Tweede kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2014). Verslag van een algemeen overleg 23 September 2014.
Voorzienings-en leveringszekerheid energie. Den Haag.
• van Ojik B. (2013). Wijziging van enkele belastingwetten en enige andere wetten (Belastingplan
2014); 33752 amendement Nr. 23; Amendement van het lid Van Ojik over het bieden van lange
termijn investeringszekerheid aan de leden van een coöperatie. Den Haag: Tweede Kamer
der Staten-Generaal.
• Vollebergh H, Drissen E, Eerens H, Geilenkirchen G. (2014). Milieubelastingen en Groene
Groei Deel II. Evaluatie van belastingen op energie in Nederland vanuit milieuperspectief.
Den Haag: PBL.
• VVD, CDA, D66, GroenLinks, ChristenUnie (2012). Lenteakkoord: Verantwoordelijkheid nemen
in crisistijd. pp 1–26.
• Wij krijgen kippen (2012). Zonne-energie, ook voor mensen zonder eigen/geschikt dak. Amsterdam.
Appendix B. Interviews
• Van Nistelrooij, Bas. Noviovolta community initiative for solar power, Nijmegen. Multiple
occasions 2015–2017.
• Van der Leij, Ernst. Morgen Groene Energie community solar cooperative, Nuenen. 23 June 2017.
• Sommerdijk, Felix. Zonnepark Nederland, Installer collective PV solar parks, Nijmegen.
10 June 2015.
• De la Court, Thijs. Gelders Energie Akkoord, energy agreement Province of Gelderland, multipe
occasions 2015.
• Muilwijk, IJmert. Former chair ODE Decentraal umbrella organization for renewable energy
cooperatives, Utrecht. 30 June 2017.
• Zomer, Siward. ODE Decentraal umbrella organization for renewable energy cooperatives,
Hilversum. 18 November 2017.
• Bekhuis, Jan. Province of Gelderland, Arnhem 8 June 2015.
• Vintgens, Volkert. Gelderland Nature and Environmental Federation (GNMF), 4 September 2015.
Appendix C. Participatory Observations during the Following Events:
• HIER opgewekt discussion meeting with Simon Visbeek (Ús Koöperaasje) and Marieke Wiersma
(Grunneger Power). The Hague. 18 November 2016.
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• Sustainable Energy Tour Gelderland. 7 October 2016.
• Gelderland Energy Agreement annual conference. Duiven. 17 March 2016.
• Monthly participatory observations during board meetings of ODE umbrella organization
2014–2015 as secretary of the board.
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